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SEXY DRESSING REVISITED: DOES TARGET DRESS PLAY A PART IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES?
THERESA M. BEINER*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the last year, a great deal of public discussion focused on why women
1
are apparently dressing and behaving more provocatively. However, issues
surrounding women’s dress are nothing new. Feminists have been debating
what constitutes appropriate female attire since the beginning of the feminist
2
movement in the United States. Since the early 1990s, when Naomi Wolf’s book
3
The Beauty Myth was released, feminists, law professors, and popular culture
critics have tried to understand women’s dress in the present day. No one
theory explains the current happenings with women’s dress—instead, the
discussion leads to tension within feminist theory: Are women exercising
freedom to dress as they please or are they simply buying into their own
objectification? Interestingly enough, tension also arises in the social science
research: How can one account for studies suggesting that people believe
women’s dress is a factor in offenses (such as sexual assault), while other studies
suggest that dress is not a factor in determining who is victimized? In
succeeding parts of this article, I will examine women’s dress in a particular
context—that of sexual harassment. I will examine the case law to see if and how
4
the dress of sexual harassment targets plays a part in sexual harassment cases. I
also will look at the social sciences and the feminist theories that frame sexual

* Nadine H. Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law. Thanks go to Professor John DiPippa and Stella Phillips for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article. Research support for this article was provided by Mary
Catherine Allen and ILL specialist Jeff Woodmansee. This research was supported by a research
grant from the William H. Bowen School of Law, for which the author is most grateful.
1. See, e.g., PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED (2005); ARIEL LEVY, FEMALE CHAUVINIST PIGS: WOMEN
AND THE RISE OF RAUNCH CULTURE (2005); SHMULEY BOTEACH, HATING WOMEN: AMERICA’S HOSTILE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FAIRER SEX (2005); LINDA M. SCOTT, FRESH LIPSTICK (2005).
2. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 1.
3. NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN
(paperback ed. 2002).
4. Throughout this essay I refer to persons who are subjected to workplace sexual harassment
interchangeably as “targets,” “victims,” and “plaintiffs.” I use the term “target” instead of “victim”
in many instances to avoid the connotations that come along with the idea of victimization. This
does not mean that women who experience workplace harassment are not victims in the normal
sense in which the word is used. However, the idea of “victimhood” has negative references that
connote a lack of agency, which I intend to undermine with the use of the term “target.” In addition,
I also refer to “target dress” as a shorthand way to refer to what a sexual harassment target is
wearing.
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harassment as another form of sex discrimination. All of this is part of a greater
effort to understand how women’s dress might or might not impact the
treatment of sexual harassment cases.
In doing so, I will draw on scholarship—both legal and social scientific—
from a related area of criminal law: rape. Scholars have long recognized how a
5
target’s dress can influence outcomes in rape cases. Jurors often blame the
victims, believing that their provocative dress somehow plays a part in the
perpetrator’s decision to rape. In spite of years of criticism of these beliefs, the
bias this injects into rape trials, and even with the enactment of rape shield
6
7
laws, this evidence still sneaks into rape cases. With this in mind, one would
expect a similar phenomenon to occur in sexual harassment cases. For instance,
judges and jurors might believe that the target somehow invited the harassment
by dressing provocatively. In sexual harassment cases, the argument that target
dress is relevant is more compelling, although equally misguided, than in rape
cases. Sexual harassment law requires a plaintiff to show that the harassment
8
was “unwelcome.” As the Supreme Court stated in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, no per se rule exists barring the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s
9
provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies. Meritor opened the
door to the admission of such evidence in the sexual harassment context.
However, the door was closed on this evidence—or, at least, nudged partly
shut—by the extension of the federal rape shield law to civil cases. Against the
10
recommendations of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Fed. R. Evid. 412 became
applicable to civil cases in 1994. Given the rule’s lack of a bright-line standard
for admissibility and the Court’s earlier position that in some cases such
evidence would be admissible, one would expect to find considerable case law
canvassing the admissibility of such evidence in sexual harassment cases.
Interestingly, few—if any—cases since Rule 412’s extension to civil cases
address this issue. One is left wondering why civil defendants are not using this
11
line of argument, which criminal defendants have successfully exploited.

5. See, e.g., Chen Shen, Study: From Attribution and Thought-Process Theory to Rape-Shield Laws:
The Meanings of Victim’s Appearance in Rape Trials, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 435, 447 (2003); Alinor C.
Sterling, Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and Semiotic Meanings of Women’s
Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87, 104–06 (1995); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING
ETC. (1993); Gary D. Lafree, Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, Jurors’ Responses to Victims’
Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 SOC. PROBS. 389, 401 (1985) (study of jurors in rape
trials noting that victim history often finds its way into rape trials in spite of rape shield laws).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. Rape Shield Laws are defined as “A statute that restricts or
prohibits the use, in rape or sexual-assault cases, of evidence about the past sexual conduct of the
victim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (8th ed. 2004).
7. For the ways in which this happens, see Shen, supra note 5, at 447.
8. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
9. Id. at 69.
10. Letter of April 29, 1994 from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to John F. Gerry, contained in
Communication from the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court of the United States (May 2, 1994), House
doc. 103-250, 103d Congress, 2d Sess.
11. Most notably, evidence about the victim’s dress was used effectively by defense attorneys in
the William Kennedy Smith case. For a description of the dress evidence that was admitted in that
case and an analysis of its use, see Sterling, supra note 5, at 113–15.
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This article reflects the process by which I approached the subject of
provocative dress and sexual harassment law. It begins by considering why a
sexual harassment target’s dress might be a subject of dispute in a sexual
harassment case. This includes a discussion of its relevance to sexual harassment
cases as well as the ambiguities in the rape shield law that should lead to
litigation on the issue. It then considers those sexual harassment cases in which
the plaintiff’s dress was discussed by the court in the course of its decision. I
discovered very few cases in which the sexual harassment target’s dress was
relevant; where it was, it rarely came into play in the case in the manner I
expected—in particular, as a means for the defendant to argue that the target
welcomed the sexually harassing behavior. Thus, I was left wondering why
there were few cases about an issue when I expected to find many. From there, I
looked for possible explanations for this “null set.” In particular, I looked to
social science and feminist legal theory to explain why the provocative dress of a
sexual harassment target does not seem to play a major role in defending against
these cases. In doing so, I draw on research about how rapist choose their targets
as well as research on perceptions of what victim behavior leads to sexual
harassment. Based on this, I posit an explanation for the dearth of cases that
suggests that sexual harassment does not operate as people often assume.
II. THE LAW ON TARGET DRESS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
A. History: Supreme Court Precedent and Federal Rule of Evidence 412
The history of the use of dress in sexual harassment cases suggests that the
admissibility of target dress would be a hotly-contested issue in such cases.
Early sexual harassment case law provides the occasional example of a sexual
12
harassment plaintiff’s case harmed by evidence of her workplace attire. This
precedent suggested that how the plaintiff dressed might play a role in
determining whether she was sexually harassed. Eventually, the rules of
evidence were changed in a manner that made the admissibility of target dress
less likely. Imposing a balancing test, the new evidentiary rule encouraged case
by case determinations of admissibility. It was not adopted without controversy.
As I explain below, the Supreme Court itself questioned the new evidence rule’s
constitutionality. This section provides a brief history of the use of target dress
in sexual harassment cases, with an eye toward explaining why one would
expect to see cases that debate the admissibility of sexual harassment target
dress.
The admissibility of evidence of a target’s dress became an important issue
in the first sexual harassment case that the Supreme Court assessed, Meritor
13
Savings Bank v. Vinson. In Meritor, the Court first set out the elements a plaintiff
must prove in order to have a viable hostile environment sexual harassment
claim. The lower court had found that any relationship between Mechelle
12. See Christina A. Bull, Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment
Plaintiff’s Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41 UCLA L. REV. 117,
126–35 (1993) (describing several early cases involving dress).
13. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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Vinson and her harasser was voluntary. Therefore, it did not amount to sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the “gravamen” of a
14
sexual harassment claim is that the harasser’s conduct be “unwelcome.” Thus,
evidence that suggested whether the plaintiff welcomed the behavior of the
purported harasser became relevant to this element essential to the claim. In
addition, the Court also set the standard for what level the harassment had to
reach in order to be actionable. As the Court explained, “not all workplace
conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or
15
privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.” Instead, “[f]or
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to
alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
16
environment.’”
The Court specifically addressed how the plaintiff’s dress might play a role
in its newly-created unwelcomeness analysis. The lower courts disagreed about
whether evidence of the plaintiff’s dress should be admissible in her sexual
17
harassment case. The D.C. Circuit explained that the evidence of plaintiff’s
18
dress and personal fantasies “had no place in this litigation.” The United States
Supreme Court disagreed, explaining:
While “voluntariness” in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it
does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is
irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular
sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously
relevant. The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine
the existence of sexual harassment in light of “the record as a whole” and the
“the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
19
context in which the alleged incidents occurred.”

Although the Court did not state that evidence of the sexual harassment target’s
provocative dress was always admissible, this decision provided a basis for
employers to discover and request admission of such evidence in sexual
harassment cases, especially on the issue of unwelcomeness.
Eight years after Meritor, the admissibility of such evidence became less
likely when Rule 412 was extended to civil cases. Rule 412 provides that in cases
involving “sexual misconduct,” evidence offered to prove that a target engaged
in other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition generally would not be
20
admissible. However, there is an exception for civil cases:

14. Id.
15. Id. at 67.
16. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
17. See Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), rev’d, 753 F.2d 141,
146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff’d sub nom., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The district
court did not directly address the plaintiff’s dress. However, the court of appeals surmised that the
district court “may” have considered her dress in finding that the conduct was “voluntary.” 753 F.2d
at 146 n.36.
18. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36.
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
20. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
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In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible
under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged
victim’s reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the
21
alleged victim.

Thus, the person wishing to have the evidence admitted—generally the
defendant in a sexual harassment case—must satisfy this balancing test and
convince a court that the probative value of the evidence “substantially
outweighs” the potential harm to the target as well as any resulting prejudice.
Such balancing tests generally lend themselves to case-specific factors. Therefore
it is reasonable to expect litigation on this issue, in spite of the extension of Rule
22
412 to civil cases.
Although it might not be clear from the text of the rule itself, the advisory
committee’s notes explain that the rule is applicable to sexual harassment cases.
As the notes explain, “Rule 412 will . . . apply in a Title VII action in which the
23
plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment.” The advisory committee also
explained that the purpose of the rule is to protect plaintiffs against “invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated
with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual
24
innuendo into the factfinding process.” The rule is designed to encourage
25
plaintiffs to come forward and pursue actions against sexual offenders. Having
one’s private life on display in court would create a significant disincentive for
targets of harassment to report such behavior and pursue these claims.
The advisory committee’s notes go further, however, and appear to counter
the Meritor Court’s position on dress. The notes define the behavior intended to
be precluded by the rule to “include activities of the mind, such as fantasies or
26
dreams.” In seeking to protect the target from stereotypical thinking that might
result from such evidence, the notes specifically state that “unless the (b)(2)
exception is satisfied, evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim’s dress,
27
speech, or lifestyle will not be admissible.” Thus, the rule’s drafters
contemplated how the rule would impact sexual harassment cases: Evidence of
the target’s dress is normally inadmissible. In limiting the admissibility of this
evidence, it appears that the advisory committee attempted to counteract or, at
least, undermine the Court’s decision on this point in Meritor.

21. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
22. The rule also sets forth a specific procedure a defendant must follow before he or she may
offer such evidence, which requires filing a written motion at least fourteen days before trial. FED. R.
EVID. 412(c)(1). A party seeking to admit such evidence must include a description of the evidence
and the purpose of its use in the motion. Id. It also provides that the court conduct a hearing in
camera which allows the parties to be heard before the evidence is admitted. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2).
Thus, the rule creates some protection for targets of sexual abuse.
23. FED. R. EVID. 412, advisory committee’s note.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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The drafters also took the opportunity to comment on how the rule might
affect the discovery process. Sometimes simply having to reveal private
information to the opposing party can discourage women from pursuing
otherwise meritorious claims. Even if the information is not admissible, damage
may still result from the embarrassment of having to release such information to
the defendant or the court. Thus, limiting discovery of this personal information
seems sensible. The drafters of the rule agreed. The advisory committee’s notes
contemplate that a court will enter appropriate protective orders to limit
discovery of information protected under Rule 412. Although the note
acknowledges that Rule 412 does not directly apply to discovery, it explains:
“[i]n order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412 . . . courts should enter
appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (governing protective
orders) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure
28
confidentiality.” It explains that such orders should be “presumptively”
entered, and any party wishing to discover such information would have to
show that the “evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the
facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through
29
discovery.”
However, given the Supreme Court’s position on the relevance of target
dress evidence, these advisory notes might not afford much protection to
targets. The drafters went on to explain that, “[i]n an action for sexual
harassment . . . some evidence of the alleged victim’s sexual behavior and/or
30
predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant.” Thus, the question
remains whether evidence of workplace dress is covered by the discovery
prohibition. Still, the notes’ contemplation that dress would normally be
inadmissible under Rule 412, absent the defendant satisfying the balancing test,
should give sexual harassment targets some solace.
The discussion of Rule 412’s application to sexual harassment cases is
limited to the advisory committee’s notes. Although the Supreme Court has
used the advisory committee’s notes in its decisions regarding the Federal Rules
31
of Evidence, it has not done so specifically with respect to Rule 412. Also, the
Supreme Court and various courts of appeal suggest that, while the federal rules
32
33
advisory committee’s notes are viewed as “instructive” and “of weight,” both
have been clear that the notes are neither binding nor determinative of a given
34
issue in their interpretation of the rules. Lower courts have looked to the

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See., e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (using advisory committee notes to
FED. R. EVID. 801); United States v. Vonn, 525 U.S. 55, 64 n.6 (2002) (“In the absence of a clear
legislative mandate, the Advisory Committee Notes provide a reliable source of insight into the
meaning of a rule, especially when, as here, the rule [FRCP 11] was enacted precisely as the
Advisory Committee proposed.”) (alteration added).
32. Moody Nat’l Bank v. GE Life & Annuity Assurance Co., 383 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2004).
33. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988).
34. See Torres, 487 U.S. at 316; Hokenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th
Cir. 2005) (explaining that, in interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 4, “[a]lthough not binding, the
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35

advisory committee’s notes for guidance in assessing the discovery and
36
admissibility of evidence under Rule 412.
It is unclear how much weight the Supreme Court would give the advisory
committee notes interpretation, given its decision in Meritor that dress is
sometimes relevant and its general opposition to extending Rule 412 to civil
cases. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in voicing the Court’s opposition:
Some members of the Court expressed the view that the amendment might
exceed the scope of the Court’s authority under the Rules Enabling Act, which
forbids the enactment of rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” This Court recognized in Meritor Saving [sic] Bank v. Vinson that evidence
of an alleged victim’s “sexually provocative speech or dress” may be relevant in
workplace harassment cases, and some Justices expressed concern that the
37
proposed amendment might encroach on the rights of defendants.

Some might see this as an invitation to open litigation on the issue of whether
38
the Court exceeded its power under the Rules Enabling Act, as well as Rule
412’s potential to infringe on the rights of defendants. This checkered history,
combined with the fact that the main text of the rule does not speak to its
applicability in sexual harassment cases, creates some uncertainty as to the
extent Rule 412 will apply to target dress in sexual harassment cases. This
uncertainty should have resulted in a great deal of civil litigation about the valid
use of Rule 412 in cases in which target dress is potentially an issue. Yet, as I
explain below, very few cases discuss this issue. Instead, target dress is being
used in a variety of ways and often is introduced by the plaintiff in sexual
harassment cases.
B. Lower Court Dress Cases
There are few lower court decisions involving Rule 412 that discuss
39
whether evidence of a target’s dress is admissible in a sexual harassment case.

interpretations in the Advisory Committee Notes ‘are nearly universally accorded great weight in
interpreting federal rules.’” (quoting Vergis v. Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, 199 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.
Ohio 2000))).
35. See, e.g., A.W. v. I. B. Corp., 224 F.R.D. 20, 23 (D. Me. 2004); Barta v. City & County of
Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996).
36. See, e.g., Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171 F.R.D. 179, 181
(D. Md. 1997).
37. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to John F. Gerry, House Document 103-250,
at v, 103d Congress, 2d Sess. (April 29, 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000); Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)) (internal citations omitted).
38. Through the Rules Enabling Act, Congress provided the Supreme Court with the authority
to create rules governing the lower courts, including the Federal Rules of Evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(a) (1990). The Act provides that the court “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.” § 2072(b) (1990). Thus, a rule that invades substantive rights can run afoul of the
Act and be invalidated.
39. See Charles C. Warner, Motions in Limine in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 29 U. MEM.
L. REV. 823, 854 (1999) (noting that “[s]ince the amendment to Rule 412 in December, 1994, there
have been relatively few reported decision in civil cases substantively illuminating the application of
the rule substantively.”).
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It appears that when the rule is invoked, courts are generally applying it
properly. There are some cases in which target dress evidence is admitted, but
often it does not carry great weight on the unwelcomeness issue for the
defendant. In most cases, Rule 412 is never discussed; hence it is difficult to
know whether the rule was ever specifically raised in the case.
Although early case law suggested that a defendant’s use of target dress in
40
defending a case might prove a significant issue, case law since the adoption of
41
Rule 412 suggests otherwise. Given the debate over the relevance of target
dress to the unwelcomeness prong of a sexual harassment claim, as well as the
balancing approach adopted in Rule 412(b), one would expect that defendants
would at least attempt to use such evidence to prove that the harassment was
not unwelcome. While there are many cases in which defendants use target
behavior, including speech, in an attempt to prove the plaintiff welcomed the
42
purportedly harassing behavior, few reported cases involve defendant’s using
target dress to show the plaintiff welcomed the harassment.
This section looks at the various ways in which target dress is playing a
role in sexual harassment cases. First, it discusses the few cases in which the
defendant attempts to use the target’s dress to show that she welcomed the
harassment and Rule 412 is invoked. Second, it discusses cases in which target
dress becomes an issue because the harassing incidents involve reactions to a
43
target’s dress. In these cases, the plaintiff uses harasser comments about her
dress to prove another element of the sexual harassment claim: that the
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable under Title VII.
This set of cases includes several in which a harasser attempts to look down a
target’s shirt or up a target’s skirt. Third, it describes cases in which a plaintiff
was told to wear something different to work because her clothing was deemed
inappropriate. The survey concludes with cases in which an employer suggested
or required a plaintiff to wear revealing clothing. In most of these cases, the
target’s dress is not being used by the defendant to show that the plaintiff
welcomed the harassment.
1. Admissibility Decisions Under Rule 412
There are few decisions involving Federal Rule of Evidence 412 that discuss
44
whether evidence of a target’s dress is admissible in a sexual harassment case.
However, in the few that have been decided, the courts tend not to admit the

40. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Plaintiff’s Conduct as Evidence in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 1 (Nov. 4, 1994); Bull, supra note 12, at 119.
41. See, e.g., Jaros v. Lodgenet Entm’t Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002) (refusing to admit
evidence of victim’s dress under FED R. EVID. 412), abrogated by Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S.
129 (2004).
42. See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 68–74 (2005) (cataloguing cases).
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
44. See Charles C. Warner, Motion in Limine in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 29 U. MEM.
L. REV. 823, 854 (1999) (noting that “[s]ince the amendment to Rule 412 in December, 1994, there
have been relatively few reported decision in civil cases illuminating the application of the rule
substantively.”).
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evidence, in keeping with the purposes behind the rule. Thus, it appears that
when the Rule is invoked, the courts are (for the most part) applying it properly.
There are some cases in which the evidence is admitted, but often it does not
carry the day on the unwelcomeness issue for the defendant. In some, Rule 412
is never discussed. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the Rule was ever raised
in the case.
Beginning with cases that were argued under Rule 412, the few courts that
have considered the issue tend to use the rule to keep evidence of target dress
out of the case. For example, in Arno v. Club Med, Inc., the defendant argued on
appeal that the court erroneously refused to admit evidence of the target’s dress
45
in a case involving a sexual assault. The defendant argued that her dress was
46
relevant to whether she cooperated with the harasser in removing her clothing.
The court reasoned that:
This argument is meritless. Under Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition is inadmissible. The
scope of Rule 412 is broad. Indeed, its drafters intended it to exclude evidence
that may have a sexual connotation, including “evidence such as that relating to
the alleged victim’s mode of dress.” At trial, the Court found that the probative
value of Arno’s clothing was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
Arno. Nevertheless, Defendants were permitted to cross-examine Arno about
the clothing and how it was removed. Thus, the Court’s ruling did not prejudice
47
Defendant’s ability to present their cooperation theory to the jury.

Likewise, in Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., the trial court excluded
48
evidence under Rule 412, a decision with which the appellate court agreed. The
defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the plaintiff “‘dressed in a
manner that accentuated her figure more than was appropriate for the
49
workplace.’” Acknowledging both the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor and
Rule 412’s extension to civil cases, the district court reasoned:
In this case, the probative value of Jaros’s attire was not strong. The only
evidence excluded from trial were comments that Jaros sometimes wore tightfitting clothing. The proffered evidence was very weak. Most of Racz’s
comments, moreover, had nothing to do with what Jaros was wearing, and
many had less to do with Jaros’s figure than Racz’s own claimed sexual prowess
or his speculation about Jaros’s sex life. The evidence proposed by LodgeNet, if
admitted at trial, would have carried the attendant danger that jurors would
base their verdicts on their opinions about Jaros’s morality and not the law of
sexual harassment. While the aspects of Jaros’s dress proffered by LodgeNet

45. 1995 WL 380124 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1995).
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. (citing FED.R. EVID. 412, advisory committee note, 1994 amend.) (internal citation
omitted).
48. 171 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (D.S.D. 2001), aff’d, 294 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Pa.
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
49. Jaros, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (citation omitted).
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prior to trial were marginally relevant, their probative value was not substantial
50
enough to warrant their admission under Rule 412.

Thus, the court did not admit evidence of the plaintiff’s dress, which is
consistent with Rule 412.
There is the occasional case after Rule 412’s extension to civil cases in which
this evidence is admitted. In Sublette v. Glidden Co., the court considered whether
evidence of plaintiff’s dress was relevant, but the plaintiff’s actions were much
51
more extreme than in those cases in which it was not admitted. Notably, the
52
plaintiff in Sublette: (1) wore a sign “essentially saying ‘Best Blow Jobs on the #8
line;’” (2) ripped her t-shirt and exposed her breast in front of others; and (3)
permitted a male co-worker to “imprint his hand print in paint on the back
53
bottom of her t-shirt, and on her buttocks.” The defendant argued that such
actions were relevant to both welcomeness and whether she perceived the
behavior to be offensive. In its Rule 412 analysis, the court began by noting that
most cases cited by the parties permitted “evidence of conduct in the workplace
54
to be introduced” under Rule 412. Under these circumstances, the court
allowed the evidence to be admitted (at least preliminarily at the motion in
limine stage), with the caveat that it might change its decision if it became clear
that the purported harassers knew nothing of the plaintiff’s behavior or the
55
plaintiff made it known directly that the harassment was unwelcome.
Even in cases in which the evidence of the target’s dress was admitted, its
impact was minimal in persuading trial judges that the plaintiff welcomed the
harassment. The cases prior to the effective date of the amendment to Rule 412
show that courts did not find this evidence very compelling. For example, in
Honea v. SGS Control Services, Inc., the defendant moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the plaintiff’s practice of occasionally not wearing a bra to work
56
was evidence that the harassment was not unwelcome. The court disagreed:
Aside from the fact that the text of Title VII does not require a woman to wear a
bra in order to pursue a claim for sexual harassment, Honea’s deposition
testimony counters the defendant’s implication by explaining that the reason
she wore no bra was because she wore coveralls to work. Moreover, she also
57
testified that she delivered roses to male and female workers alike.

Under these circumstances, the court denied the defendant’s summary
judgment motion.
Similarly, in Wilson v. Wayne County, the court was not impressed with the
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s wearing short shorts to work and

50. Id. at 1003–04.
51. No. 97-CV-5047, 1998 WL 964189, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1998).
52. While the plaintiff engaged in other provocative behavior, the allegations described above
are those that involved her clothing. See id. at *1–2.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id. at *4.
56. 859 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
57. Id.
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coming by the office in a bathing suit and shorts on her way back from a
58
canoeing trip in some way welcomed her boss’ sexual assault. As the court
explained,
[t]he fact that an eighteen-year-old girl wore shorts during the summer months
in Tennessee, wore a bathing suit on a canoe trip, and engaged in non-sexual
horseplay with a co-worker her own age should not be perceived by even the
59
most optimistic fifty-three-year-old man as a willingness to have sex with him.

Both of these cases occurred in 1994, shortly before Rule 412 became effective for
civil cases. Thus, even without Rule 412, courts rarely found this evidence
60
probative. This holds true for cases decided after the extension of Rule 412 as
well. In EEOC v. Rotary Corp., the defendant moved for summary judgment
arguing that the evidence showed that plaintiff welcomed the sexually harassing
61
behavior by her “‘sexually provocative dress and behavior.’” The court denied
summary judgment, holding that this was a matter for the jury.
In contrast, target dress evidence played a particularly important role in
62
Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C. In this case, the court used the plaintiff’s attire as part
of its reasoning in granting summary judgment, even though the plaintiff was
63
subjected to fairly severe sexual harassment. The case is problematic because it
predates the Supreme Court’s decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, which held that plaintiffs who pursue a claim under a hostile
environment theory could include harassment occurring prior to the 300-day
claim period under Title VII, so long as at least one act of harassment occurred
64
within the 300-day period. In Woodard, a great deal of harassing behavior was
excluded under the pre-Morgan rule, because it occurred before the 300-day cutoff for employment discrimination claims. However, there still were significant
acts of harassment within the 300-day period. The clothing-related allegations in
this case included the fact that the plaintiff owned a lingerie store. She posted
flyers that included a photo of her modeling the lingerie on a bulletin board at
65
work. She also offered to put on “private shows” at the store for her co66
workers. She wore what the court characterized as “skimpy or provocative”
67
clothing to work. She filed several motions in limine in an effort to keep this
evidence out of consideration for purposes of the defendant’s summary

58. Wilson v. Wayne County, 868 F. Supp. 1254, 1257–60 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
59. Id. at 1260. The plaintiff still lost on the issue of holding the sheriff individually liable. Title
VII only applies to the employer and does not provide a mechanism for holding individual harassers
liable.
60. See also Meadows v. Guptill, 856 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding evidence of
plaintiff’s manner of dress and purported “touchy” behavior had little “probative force,” especially
given the nature of the sexual harassment allegations in the case).
61. EEOC v. Rotary Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 643, 662 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted).
62. Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C., No. IP 98-646-C H/G, 2000 WL 684101 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2000).
63. Id.
64. 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002).
65. Woodard, 2000 WL 684101, at *3.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *6.
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judgment motion. The court considered whether the evidence was admissible
under Rule 412. The court found the evidence relevant to the subjective
component of the sexual harassment claim, which was whether the plaintiff
69
personally found the behavior harassing. Curiously, however, the court did not
discuss the evidence in terms of unwelcomeness, arguing instead that it was
relevant to “evaluating whether Metro [the defendant] responded reasonably to
her complaint and whether Metro should have discovered the alleged
70
harassment and responded earlier.”
Concluding that such evidence was admissible, the court explained that the
relevance of the evidence “substantially outweighs any potential unfair
71
prejudicial effect of such evidence on Woodard’s claims.” The court reasoned
that the underlying purpose behind Rule 412—preventing embarrassment to the
plaintiff by revealing private information—would not be furthered in this case,
72
because the plaintiff herself brought this information into the workplace. The
73
plaintiff wore “hot pants,” low-cut tops, and buttocks-revealing shorts to work.
74
When told to put on more clothes for work, plaintiff responded, “‘I am wearing
75
what I want to wear.’” The court ultimately granted the defendant’s summary
judgment motion, reasoning that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to be actionable and that the employer responded reasonably to her
76
complaints.
Yet, the acts of harassment in this case were fairly egregious. The plaintiff
made allegations about four employees at Metro, but of those, the actions of one
co-worker, Smith, were particularly severe. The plaintiff testified that Smith
talked about his penis frequently, was “constantly trying to force himself” on
her, tried to feel her breasts, tried “to feel between her legs,” and tried to kiss
77
her. It is surprising that such actions would not be subjectively severe or
pervasive enough to be actionable as a matter of law, even though the plaintiff
did engage in some voluntary conduct at work. Yet, the court was extremely
dismissive of this case, beginning its opinion with “[t]his case presents truly
meritless allegations of sexual harassment. If the case has any effect beyond
these parties, it will only be to make it more difficult for women who genuinely
are victims of sexual harassment on the job to prove their cases and obtain
78
remedies.” This case stands as a rare example of a court reaching such a
decision. For the most part, courts considered evidence of dress inadmissible or
not determinative in the cases before them.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at *11.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
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As a general matter, evidence of the sexual harassment target’s dress is not
playing a major role in determining whether the plaintiff welcomed the
harassment. While some courts admit such evidence, even when it is admitted,
it does not prove to be very effective for the defendant. While the history of
target dress in sexual harassment cases suggests that there would be a lot of
litigation on this issue, the cases are relatively rare. Instead, target dress is
coming into play in other ways.
2. Comments on Dress as Part of the Harassing Behavior
Another way that target dress is used in sexual harassment cases is by the
plaintiff herself. In order to prove a claim of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must
show that the behavior involved was “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive work
79
environment.’” Plaintiffs use evidence concerning comments about their dress
as part of the incidents that comprise the harassment. While perhaps one of the
largest misperceptions about sexual harassment law is that an individual can be
accused of sexual harassment simply by complimenting a co-worker on his or
her attire—the case law and legal standards suggest otherwise. While many
targets of sexual harassment allege comments about their dress as part of the
sexually harassing incidents, such comments generally are not the only conduct
or behavior involved in the case, and many of the comments are made in a
manner that would not be viewed as complimentary.
Rather than simply being about an individual “looking nice today,”
80
sexually-harassing comments objectify or sexualize the target. For example, in
Landrey v. City of Glenwood Springs, the harasser told the plaintiff that “‘there’s
81
nothing uglier than a fat woman in stretch pants.’” In Ammon v. Baron
Automotive Group, the plaintiff was told by one of her harassers that “‘I’d love to
lick those pants off you,’” that she had “‘nice legs,’” and that she “‘should wear
82
a dress more often.’” While one of her co-workers “associated plaintiff’s attire
83
with a street walker or a school teacher,” the court did little with these
comments in the context of deciding the case. Thus, they did not appear to help
84
the defendant’s case. Similarly, in Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, the
plaintiff’s manager told her that he would like to see her in a wet t-shirt, asked
her if she was wearing underwear, and said that he liked her “dress because

79. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982), and Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
80. See, e.g., Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, 953 F. Supp. 1438, 1446–47 (M.D. Ala. 1996);
Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992); Hutchison v. Amateur
Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1994); Aldridge v. Kansas, No. 96-2382-JWL, 1997 WL
614323 (D. Kan. Sept. 10, 1997).
81. 03CV01299EWNBNB, 2006 WL 726634, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2006) (citation omitted).
82. 270 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1300 n.3, 1301 (D. Kan. 2003) (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 1301. This is a curious juxtaposition, as school teachers are generally not thought to
dress like street walkers.
84. The Landrey plaintiff lost on summary judgment, with the court holding that the harassment
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. Landrey, 2006 WL 726634, at *11. Summary
judgment was denied in Ammon, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1307–08.
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85

when she bent over he could see her ‘tits.’” In Magnuson v. Peak Technical
Services, Inc., the harasser told the plaintiff she “looked so good” that he had to
86
“go back into the restroom” to relieve himself sexually. Her co-workers also
87
discussed her anatomy. In both Brassfield and Magnuson, the court denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In Nievaard v. City of Ann Arbor,
88
comments were made daily about the plaintiff’s clothes and appearance. She
was told she was “sexy,” that if she “pulled down her shirt a little more the
89
workers could have a ‘view all day,’” and that her shirts were “‘too tight.’”
In addition, there are cases in which harassers comment on how targets
look in their work uniforms or attempt to pay what appears to be a
90
compliment. However, these are rarely the only acts of harassment. For
example, in Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., the plaintiff’s supervisor told her
91
how beautiful she looked. This was not the only act of harassment, but instead
was one among many incidents, including “numerous unwelcome and
upsetting suggestive comments and advances” that the plaintiff’s supervisor
92
directed at her. In this case, the court upheld a jury’s verdict in the plaintiff’s
93
favor. Similarly, in Stefanoni v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Burlington, the plaintiff alleged seven incidents of harassment, including five
94
compliments on her hair and perfume over a twenty-two month period. These
comments, together with two incidents of physical touching, were insufficient to
95
a raise an issue of fact on the severe or pervasive element. In another case, a
hotel employee alleged that a supervisor harassed her by commenting about
how “attractive” she was, that she was “sexy in her uniform,” and that “she
96
97
turned him on.” There were also allegations of unwanted physical contact.
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s sexual
harassment claim, noting that there is a “high bar for what constitutes
sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment for the purposes of a claim of a
98
hostile work environment.” Thus, comments about the target’s attire are

85. 953 F. Supp. at 1446–47 (citation omitted).
86. 808 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1992) (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 506.
88. 124 Fed. App’x 948, 949 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
89. Id. at 952. She was also told that she would fit in better at work if she dressed “less
femininely.” Id. at 954. The court relegated this comment to a “concern about the appropriateness of
her attire” and held that it was insufficient to establish a hostile environment. Id.
90. See, e.g., Holmes v. Razo, No. 94 C 50405, 1995 WL 444407 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1995).
91. 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 300.
94. 65 Fed. App’x 783, 784 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
95. See id. at 785–86 (granting defedant’s motion for summary judgment). See also O’Dell v.
Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting summary judgment for
defendant where purported harasser, among other things, complimented plaintiff about her
appearance).
96. Baker v. Starwood Hotel & Resort Worldwide, Inc., No. 98-2076, 1999 WL 397405, at *2 (E.D.
La. June 15, 1999).
97. Id.
98. Id. at *3.
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sometimes used by the plaintiff as part of the sexually-harassing incidents that
comprise her claim, although this does not mean that the plaintiff will reach the
“severe or pervasive” standard necessary to support a claim.
Consistent with this standard, when a compliment is the only act of
harassment, courts generally do not find it sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to be actionable. In Conley v. City of Lincoln City, the city manager told
the plaintiff, the chief of police, that “she looked ‘attractive’ and ‘nice’ in her
99
police uniform.” The court held the comment insufficient to create a hostile
100
environment. Although the plaintiff tried to link this remark to a request by
the city manager that she attend a seminar with him, the court did not believe
that the manager had an “ulterior motive” for the request, explaining instead
101
that the plaintiff’s reaction was not “reasonable.”
Another set of cases in which the plaintiff used dress allegations to support
her claim involve situations in which the harasser tried to look down the
102
plaintiff’s top or up her dress or skirt. While no employer has apparently
defended these allegations by arguing that the plaintiff’s dress somehow invited
such behavior, one could imagine that certain tops are easier to look down than
others. However, thus far, defendants and courts have not focused on how the
plaintiff’s attire might have led to her harassment. Instead, this evidence is used
by the plaintiff to prove (although not always successfully) that the severity or
pervasiveness of the harassment reached a level that was actionable.
3. Inappropriate Attire Cases
Another line of cases involving target dress exists in which the plaintiff’s
superior asks her to dress differently because her attire is considered somehow
“inappropriate” for the workplace. Plaintiffs have argued that such guidance
from management about their attire constitutes sexual harassment. Not
surprisingly, courts have rejected such claims. For example, in Courtney v.
Landair Transport, Inc., the plaintiff’s manager told her that her attire was not
103
appropriate for work because she was “showing too much cleavage.” While
this was one of several allegations of harassment, the court quickly disposed of
this aspect, stating:
Plaintiff claims that management discriminated against her because a terminal
manager cautioned her as to her inappropriate attire in the workplace. A
manager’s warning, without more, that plaintiff’s clothing is inappropriate in

99. Conley v. City of Lincoln City, No. 02-216-AS, 2004 WL 948427, at *4 n.2 (D. Or. Apr. 20,
2004).
100. See id. at *12 (holding that defendant’s actions did not amount to sexual harassment). The
plaintiff had other claims in her case as well.
101. Id. at *12.
102. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1999)
(harasser simulated looking up plaintiff’s dress and tried to look down her clothing); Ammon v.
Baron Auto. Group, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1308–09 (D. Kan. 2003) (harasser looked up one plaintiff’s
skirt and attempted to look down another plaintiff’s blouse).
103. 227 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 2000) (brought under Ohio’s anti-discrimination laws, which are
interpreted the same as Title VII).
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the workplace is not sexual harassment. Plaintiff fails to show that the terminal
manager’s comments were anything more than a legitimate concern regarding
104
appropriate dress in the workplace.

In Schmitz v. ING Securities, Futures & Options, Inc., part of the plaintiff’s
sexual harassment allegations included that her purported harasser had called
her into his office and “accused her of disrupting office productivity by dressing
105
so provocatively that any ‘hot-blooded male’ in the office could be aroused.”
Her harasser, the CFO of the company, never expressed any interest in her or
106
touched her. However, once she complained about his comments to the
director of Human Resources, her workload increased and the CFO became
107
“openly hostile and ceased speaking to her.” She was eventually terminated
108
for inadequate job performance. In assessing her claim of sexual harassment,
the court reasoned that the CFO commented on her appearance “with the
109
expressed aim of bettering her professional image and her career prospects.”
While he may have failed to “treat a female employee with sensitivity, tact, and
110
delicacy,” his comments did not constitute sexual harassment. This was
supported by two of plaintiff’s female superiors, who stated that they too had
informally commented to the plaintiff that “some of her outfits were not
111
appropriate for the business environment.”
In Bahri v. Home Depot USA, Inc., one of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment
allegations included that comments were made about her dress, hair, and
112
shoes. Employees complained that the plaintiff, Nelson, dressed “like she was
113
‘going to a cocktail party.’” Eventually, Nelson’s supervisor told her that her
shoes violated company policy, that her co-workers were complaining about her
attire, and requested that she not dress “too fancy” for the home-improvement
114
store environment in which she worked. The court concluded that these
comments did not amount to actionable sexual harassment. The court reasoned:
The evidence concerning Brownlie’s comments about Nelson’s style of dress
indicate that Nelson and Brownlie simply disagreed over whether her clothing
looked “professional” or “too fancy.” Such a disagreement, even when between
115
members of the opposite sex, is not overtly sexual in nature.

104. Id. at 564.
105. 191 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table opinion), available at 1999 WL 528024, at **1.
106. Id.
107. Id. at **2.
108. Id.
109. Id. at **3.
110. Id.
111. Id. at **4.
112. 242 F. Supp. 2d 922, 950 (D. Or. 2002).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 950.
115. Id. at 951. There also was evidence of a profane sex-based term being used with reference to
the plaintiff, but the employer was not aware of this until after her termination. Id.
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As a general matter then, an employer’s counseling of an employee to dress
more professionally or less provocatively has not been found actionable as
116
sexual harassment.
4. Plaintiff Asked to Dress Provocatively
There are also cases in which the plaintiff’s employer requires her to dress
provocatively as part of her job and as a result the plaintiff is harassed. While
there are entire law review articles written about the restaurant Hooters and its
117
wait staff’s attire, very few cases against them have been resolved on the
118
merits, and the few that have do not directly involve the plaintiff’s dress.
Employers generally lost early cases involving allegations that female workers
were required to dress provocatively. The case often cited on this issue is EEOC
119
v. Sage Realty Corp. In Sage Realty, the plaintiff worked as a building lobby
120
121
attendant. Her employer required her to wear a uniform on the job. One
uniform consisted of an octagonal piece of cloth that resembled an American
122
flag that was worn like a poncho. On the five-foot-eight plaintiff, the uniform
123
revealed “[h]er thighs and portions of her buttocks.” Even after attempts at
124
alterations, the uniform was still revealing. The plaintiff wore the uniform for
two days and “received a number of sexual propositions and endured lewd
comments and gestures. Humiliated by what occurred, [the plaintiff] was unable
125
to perform her duties properly.” Eventually, the plaintiff was fired because she
126
refused to wear the uniform. The court reasoned that the employer required

116. But see Kelly v. Lopiccolo, 5 Fed. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (upholding jury
verdict for plaintiff in § 1983 sexual harassment case in which there were allegations that employer
counseled plaintiff about wearing undergarments that violated employer guidelines; however, there
were other allegations of harassment from other employees).
117. See generally, e.g., Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163 (1997); Kelly Ann Cahill,
Hooters: Should there be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Cases?, 48 VAND L. REV. 1107 (1995).
118. See, e.g., Ciesielski v. Hooters Mgmt. Corp., No. 03 C 1175, 2005WL 608245 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15,
2005) (jury verdict against Hooters in sexual harassment case where employees were harassers
upheld; no discussion of waitress attire); EEOC v. Gaffney, No. Civ.A.3:01CV0619-P, 2001 WL
1338368 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2001) (motion to dismiss sexual harassment complaint denied); Steinhoff
v. Uprive Rest. Joint Venture, 117 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor; no
discussion of waitress attire); Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (action
to compel arbitration); Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93 C 7709, 94 C 6338, 1996 WL 164427 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 29, 1996) (class certification in a sex discrimination based on hiring practices). Some Hooters
sexual harassment cases have settled. See Andrew Blum, Hooters Suit Lawyer Faces Ethics Complaint
But the Attorney Hints that Her Ex-Clients Were Intimidated by the Restaurant’s Side, 16 NAT’L L.J. 13, col.
1 (Nov. 15, 1993); ‘Hooters’ Accord Reached, 16 NAT’L L.J. A8, col. 2 (May 30, 1994).
119. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
120. Id. at 602.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 604.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 605.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 607.
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the plaintiff to wear the uniform because she was a woman and that the uniform
127
caused her to endure repeated harassment. The court believed that wearing
the uniform was a condition of the plaintiff’s employment and that the employer
either knew or could reasonably have expected her to be subjected to sexual
128
harassment because of it. While acknowledging that an employer may
“impose reasonable grooming and dress requirements on its employees,” this
does “not mean that ‘an employer has the unfettered discretion . . . [t]o require
its employees to wear any uniform the employer chooses, including uniforms
129
which may be characterized as revealing and sexually provocative.’”
Hooters aside, most commentators agree that employers cannot require
130
employees to wear uniforms that subject them to sexual harassment. The Sage
Realty case is from 1981 and is rather dated. It is also somewhat inconsistent
with the theory that attire alone does not result in women being harassed, which
is more thoroughly discussed below. Thus, it is not clear what the courts would
do with a case in which a woman voluntarily agreed to wear a revealing
uniform.
5. Sum-Up: How Target Dress Is Actually Addressed in Sexual Harassment
Cases
Overall, the most prevalent cases involving sexual harassment target dress
appear to be the cases in which the plaintiff raises comments about her attire as
part of her sexual harassment allegations. While there are some cases addressing
admissibility under Rule 412, most often the court does not admit the evidence,
and even when it does, the evidence does not carry much weight. The lack of
cases in which defendants use target dress in defending cases is in itself
puzzling. It could be that most defendants refrain from making such arguments
because of Rule 412. Yet, there seems to be some room for defendants to
maneuver, given the balancing test, questions about Supreme Court precedent,
and the Court’s own questioning of the validity of the rule. One might expect,
some twelve years after the effective date of Rule 412, to see a split in the circuits
on this issue.
Another explanation for the lack of cases may be that targets of harassment
are not generally provocatively dressed. Thus, there would be little opportunity
for defendants to use these arguments. If sexual harassment is about power, not
about sexuality or finding someone attractive, then dress comes into play when
it affects how a harasser targets a victim. The underlying social science that has
developed around this issue, as well as around the issue of rape, provides
information that may help explain the lack of cases.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 608.
129. Id. at 608–09 (quoting EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
130. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1395, 1416–17 (1992).
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III. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DRESS
Social science has much to offer in determining the meaning of women’s
dress and how it might affect sexual harassment cases. A variety of academic
disciplines have analyzed women’s dress, looking at what it means to both the
person wearing the clothing and perceivers of that person as well as its broader
social implications. This section discusses several aspects of social science that
may help explain why defendants are not using evidence concerning the
provocative nature of the plaintiff’s dress to show that the target welcomed the
harassment. In doing so, it lays the foundation for the argument, made more
explicitly in the next section, that the reason defendants are not seeking to admit
evidence of plaintiff’s provocative dress in sexual harassment cases as
frequently as might be supposed is because provocatively-dressed women may
not be the likely targets of sexual harassment.
The section begins by discussing how perceptions of victim dress play a
role in perceptions of rape and sexual harassment. In this context it investigates
how a woman’s dress affects perceptions of that woman in a manner that might
have relevance for sexual harassment law. For example, are provocatively
dressed women harassed more often, and, more importantly, do people think
this is the case? Do people believe that provocatively dressed women invite
harassment? It then looks at what is known about how rapists and, to a lesser
extent, sexual harassers, choose their victims in an effort to determine whether
common perceptions of the role dress plays in victimization is accurate. From
there it looks at characteristics of both rape and sexual harassment victims to see
if, based on who these women are, sexual harassers may be choosing their
victims in a manner similar to rapists. It also addresses research about sexual
harassers to determine if they share some common characteristics with rapists,
which may make some of the research concerning rape applicable to sexual
harassment. Finally, it looks for social science explanations for why dress makes
a difference in perceptions of who is likely to be harassed. Throughout this
section, I rely on social science of rape in situations in which there is little
research on sexual harassment. I explain why this is justified at the points in my
argument where it becomes relevant.
Underlying rape shield laws is the belief that people, and in particular
jurors, mistakenly believe that a women’s dress has an impact on whether she
will be victimized. This belief is borne out by research on perceptions of
women’s dress. As one source elucidates:
Although women with provocative appearances are perceived as sexually
attractive and more desirable, they are judged as less intelligent, sincere,
trustful, reliable, and less moral than women with non-provocative
appearances. . . . Further, . . . “appearance influences judgments of a sender’s
competence (ability or expertise), even when the task at hand is unrelated to
131
appearance.”

131.

Shen, supra note 5, at 439.
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Clearly, dress influences how people perceive and interact with one another.
Yet, assessments of women’s attitudes or beliefs based on their dress are not
necessarily accurate. For example, while people believe that certain items of
clothing signify more liberal sexual attitudes, one study suggests that in reality,
132
few items of clothing actually correlate with such liberal attitudes. Thus,
generally-held perceptions of sexualized dressing may well be out of sync with
any one individual’s attitudes and behaviors.
Perhaps most notably, a survey of psychiatrists reported that a three-to-one
majority of those responding “said that attire that the male perceives as inviting
133
direct sex attention does, indeed, tend to increase sex crime risk.” The styles of
clothing that psychiatrists thought carried this potential risk included short
134
skirts, see-through dresses, short shorts, and bikinis. As they concluded, “[t]he
survey replies show that U.S. psychiatrists in large numbers believe that
revealing attire is one of the causative or precipitating factors in sex crimes
135
against young females.” Thus, highly-educated and learned adults believe that
how a woman dresses has an impact on whether or not she will be a victim of a
sex crime.
The same general findings hold true for dress and sexual harassment. A
study involving 200 college students sought to determine whether target dress
and gender of a perceiver played a part in determining who was likely to be
136
sexually harassed. “The model when wearing provocative clothing was rated
significantly higher on likelihood of provoking sexual harassment . . . than when
137
wearing nonprovocative clothing.” Interestingly, women rated the model
dressed provocatively highest on the likelihood of provoking sexual
138
harassment. However, men and women did not differ in their assessment of
139
the model wearing nonprovocative clothing. This suggests that women are
more inclined to believe that provocative dress has an impact on who is
harassed. While this study shows women are more inclined to link provocative
dress with sexual harassment, it is important to note that both men and women
perceive this link. The question remains whether this perception is accurate.
While people perceive dress to have an impact on who is assaulted, studies
of rapists suggest that victim attire is not a significant factor. Instead, rapists
look for signs of passiveness and submissiveness, which, studies suggest, are

132. See Eugene W. Mathes & Sherry B. Kempher, Clothing as a Nonverbal Communicator of Sexual
Attitudes and Behavior, 43 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 495 (1976) (only cut-offs and tops exposing
midriffs correlated with attitudes toward premarital sex).
133. Donna Vali & Nicholas D. Rizzo, Apparel as One Factor in Sex Crimes Against Young Females:
Professional Opinions of U.S. Psychiatrists, 35 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 167,
174 (1991).
134. Id. at 172.
135. Id. at 178.
136. Kim K.P. Johnson & Jane E. Workman, Clothing and Attributions Concerning Sexual
Harassment, 21 HOME ECON. RES. J. 160, 165 (1992).
137. Id. at 167.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 167–68.
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more likely to coincide with more body-concealing clothing. In a study to test
whether males could determine whether women were high or low in
passiveness and submissiveness, Richards and her colleagues found that men,
using only nonverbal appearance cues, could accurately assess which women
141
were passive and submissive versus those who were dominant and assertive.
Clothing was one of the key cues: “Those females high in passivity and
submissiveness (i.e., those at greatest risk for victimization) wore noticeably
more body-concealing clothing (i.e., high necklines, long pants and sleeves,
142
multiple layers).” This suggests that men equate body-concealing clothing
with passive and submissive qualities, which are qualities that rapists look for in
victims. Thus, those who wore provocative clothes would not be viewed as
passive or submissive, and would be less likely to be victims of assault.
Along these lines, research suggests that rape victims are “significantly
143
lower” in “dominance, assertiveness, and social presence.” While members of
the public believe that victims of assault attract such attacks by dressing
144
provocatively, attractiveness does not correlate with submissive characteristics
145
in victims. Instead, research “specifically revealed a negative relationship
between perceptions of attractiveness and traits which could be construed as
146
contributing to a nonverbal appearance of vulnerability.” Thus:
Male evaluators perceived attractive females as lower in submissiveness,
uncertainty, simpleness, carelessness and passivity than their less attractive
peers. This suggests that conventional definitions of physical attractiveness do
not represent visual attributes which enhance a woman’s potential for
147
victimization.

This seems at odds with studies concerning provocative dress, although no
studies have looked directly at provocative dress and submissiveness. Of course,
attractiveness and provocative dress are not the same thing. As Glick and his
colleagues point out, it can be difficult to alter one’s physical attractiveness, “but
women can easily emphasize or deemphasize their sexuality through clothing
148
and demeanor.” Thus, dressing sexy or provocatively is a choice that may or
may not lead to a woman being perceived as attractive. Still, women who dress
provocatively may be exhibiting a degree of confidence that does not suggest
submissiveness. These women would be less likely to be victims of sexual
140. Shen, supra note 5, at 441.
141. Lynne Richards, A Theoretical Analysis of Nonverbal Communication and Victim Selection for
Sexual Assaults, 9 CLOTHING & TEXTILES RES. J. 55, 59–60 (Summer 1991) (discussing Lynne Richards
et al., Perceptions of Submissiveness: Implications for Victimization, 125 J. PSYCH. 407 (1991)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 59.
144. One study showed that “only four percent of reported rapes involve precipitous behavior
by the victim.” Sterling, supra note 5, at 119.
145. Richards, supra note 141, at 59.
146. Id. (citing A. Miller, Role of Physical Attractiveness in Impression Formation, 19 PSYCHONOMIC
SCI. 241 (1970)).
147. Id.
148. Peter Glick et al., Evaluations of Sexy Women in Low- and High-Status Jobs, 29 PSYCH. WOMEN
Q. 389, 389 (2005).
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assault or harassment, because potential abusers would not perceive them as
passive or submissive.
No studies were readily available that explained how sexual harassers
target their victims. However, there is information about who is more likely to
be targeted for sexual harassment. Interestingly, it parallels what is known
about rape victims: “Young and single women tend to be the targets of sexual
149
harassment.” However, sexual harassment can happen to any women, and,
studies show, once other factors are considered (such as workplace
characteristics and the form the sexual harassment takes), the impact of age and
150
marital status on who is harassed lessens considerably. Youth and being single
are factors related to power. As one researcher observed, “[d]ifferences in age,
marital status, and education reinforce gender differences in power and status in
151
society.” Thus, because sexual harassment is about power, differences in these
power-related statuses are likely to correlate with who is sexually harassed.
This parallels research on rape victims. While, like sexual harassment, any
woman can be a rape victim, “studies have shown that the rape victim is more
likely to be a single, white or black young female, from a lower social working
class. Further ‘women who are most vulnerable to rape exhibit lower levels of
psychosocial effectiveness’ and tend to have passive or submissive personalities
152
prior to the assaults.”
Thus, it appears that victims of rape and victims of sexual harassment share
some common characteristics. Yet, much of the research discussed above
involves how rapists choose their victims—not how sexual harassers choose
their targets. Thus, it may not be directly applicable to sexual harassment.
However, research also suggests that perpetrators of more serious sexual
153
harassment are on a continuum with rapists. Research on rapists might be
likewise helpful in determining how sexual harassers choose their targets.
Sexual harassers, like rapists, may pick victims who are vulnerable and
submissive. Research on men who are likely to sexually harass suggests that this
leap is logical.
Psychologist John Pryor was one of the first to study characteristics of men
who sexually harass. He developed a scale to determine the propensity of men
154
to sexually harass. His sexual harassment research is based, in part, on the
research of those who study rape. As he explains, “[m]any researchers believe
rape and severe forms of sexual harassment are conceptually similar forms of

149. James E. Gruber, An Epidemiology of Sexual Harassment: Evidence from North America and
Europe, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 84, 92 (William O’Donohue
ed., 1997).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 90.
152. Shen, supra note 5, at 437 (quoting Richards, supra note 141, at 58) (footnotes omitted).
153. See, e.g., John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269 (1987); John B.
Pryor & Lynnette M. Stoller, Sexual Cognition Processes in Men High in the Likelihood to Sexually Harass,
20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 163 (1994). Rapists have a “pronounced psychological need[]
for dominance and aggression.” Richards, supra note 141, at 61.
154. Pryor, supra note 153, at 272–73.
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Researchers see rape as on a continuum of “malebehavior.”
aggressive/female-passive” interactions that involve differing levels of coercion
156
and sexual intimacy. This led Pryor to opine that rapists and sexual harassers
might have some characteristics in common. As a result, he set out to study
characteristics of sexual harassers to see if this was true.
Pryor examined those who would be inclined to engage in sexual
exploitation, essentially what amounts to quid pro quo harassment. Pryor used
various other scales, including those that measured certain attitudes about sex
roles and beliefs, attitudes towards feminism, likelihood to rape, and one that
157
measured empathy. What he found was a strong relationship between the
likelihood-to-sexually-harass scale (LSH) and adversary sexual beliefs and rape158
myth acceptance. Weaker relationships were found for sex-role stereotyping
159
and acceptance of interpersonal violence. Tellingly, “[t]he single best predictor
of LSH was Malamuth’s (1981) LR [likelihood-to-rape] scale. This result . . .
supports [another researcher’s] contention that rape and severe forms of sexual
160
harassment represent different degrees of coercive sexual conduct.”
Interestingly, men who scored higher on the LSH scale also had a harder time
161
understanding the perspective of others. As Pryor explained, “[t]he profile of a
person who is likely to initiate severe sexually harassing behavior that emerges
from the initial study is one that emphasizes sexual and social male
162
dominance.”
This scale has proven useful after further study. As Pryor and Stoller point
out, “the LSH scale measures a readiness to use social power for sexually
exploitative purposes. This suggests that social dominance and male sexuality
163
may be closely aligned concepts in the minds of high-LSH men.” In a
subsequent study, they found that dominance was the best predictor of LSH in
men. As they explained, “[t]his finding seems to buttress the argument that
164
dominance and sexuality are integrally related for high-LSH men.” Thus, it
seems appropriate to opine that sexual harassers might choose their targets in a
manner similar to that of rapists. These two groups of perpetrators share
common characteristics. Further, sexual harassment by high LSH men appears
to be triggered by power imbalances—the kind of imbalances that might well be
triggered by target submissiveness.

155. Id. at 272.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 277–78.
158. Id. at 275. As examples, Pryor explained that adversarial sexual beliefs include: “In a dating
relationship a woman is largely out to take advantage of a man . . . . [R]ape myth acceptance
[includes such beliefs that] ‘[m]any women have an unconscious wish to be raped, and may
unconsciously set up a situation in which they are likely to be attacked.’” Id. at 275–76.
159. Id. at 276.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 277.
163. Pryor & Stoller, supra note 153, at 164.
164. Id. at 166.
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This conclusion is inconsistent with the common belief that how a woman
dresses has an impact on whether she will be sexually harassed or sexually
assaulted. Why then, do many people, including psychiatrists, assume that dress
plays some part in who is a victim of sexual assaults? In particular, why do
women believe this? Social scientists believe this is the result of the “just world
hypothesis.” As Melvin Lerner explained,
for their own security, if for no other reason, people want to believe they live in
a just world where people get what they deserve. One way of accomplishing
this is by . . . persuading himself that the victim deserved to suffer, after all. The
assumption here is that attaching responsibility to behavior provides us with the
165
greater security—we can do something to avoid such a fate.

Thus, in the context of sexual harassment, this explains why women, more than
men, are inclined to believe that provocative dress has an impact on who is
sexually harassed. Women attribute the harassment to something the victim has
done, such as wearing provocative clothing, as a way to understand how it
could happen to someone else and not to them. Thus, blaming the victim, for
example, by believing she provoked the behavior by her dress, makes other
women believe that dressing differently (i.e., more “appropriately”) will prevent
166
it from happening to them.
This is closely related to another theory known as “harm avoidance.”
Women blame victims as a way to exercise control over their lives and to
continue to believe that bad things, including sexual harassment and sexual
167
assaults, will not happen to them. Thus, by viewing provocative dress as a
factor in sexual harassment, women believe that they can avoid sexual
harassment simply by not dressing provocatively. Both of these theories provide
explanations as to why women, in particular, may think that harassment or
sexual assault is provoked by victim dress.
Thus, how people commonly perceive the role of a target’s dress in sexual
harassment appears to be out of sync with how sexual harassers may choose
their targets. This leads to a possible explanation as to why defendants are not
using target dress to prove unwelcomeness.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DRESS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
The social science described above suggests some potential explanations as
to why defendants do not regularly raise the issue of target dress to rebut
unwelcomeness in sexual harassment cases. Given the purported recent increase

165. Melvin J. Lerner, Desire for Justice and Reactions to Victims, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING
BEHAVIOR: SOME SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 205 (J.
Macaulay & L. Berkowitz, eds., 1970), quoted in Theresa L. Lennon, Sharron J. Lennon & Kim K.P.
Johnson, Is Clothing Probative of Attitude or Intent? Implications for Rape and Sexual Harassment Cases, 11
LAW & INEQ. 391, 410–11 (1993).
166. Lennon, Lennon & Johnson, supra note 165, at 411.
167. Johnson & Workman, supra note 136, at 164, 170.

03__BEINER.DOC

2/8/2007 2:01 PM

SEXY DRESSING REVISITED

149

168

in provocative dress by women and the lack of a solid legal standard against
its admission, one would expect to see defendants using arguments and
evidence about target dress to prove welcomeness—or at least, to dis-prove unwelcomeness. Yet, this practice appears uncommon. How does one account for
this? Earlier in this article I suggested several potential explanations. First, it
could be that defendants are not raising it because they believe either that they
will not be successful in having the evidence admitted under Rule 412 or that
the factfinder will be in some way offended by such attempts. Essentially, the
tactic might backfire on the defendant. Second, it is possible that women who
wear provocative clothing to work do not mind the attention that they receive
from it and therefore are not bringing sexual harassment claims. Third, it is
possible that victim dress does not have an impact on who is sexually harassed.
Legal feminists have long argued that sexual harassment is about power. With
this in mind, the work of social scientists suggests that potential harassers might
choose their targets using criteria other than dress.
Legal and social science scholars have proposed a number of theories
suggesting why and how sexual harassment occurs. The foremost legal scholar
on this issue, Catharine MacKinnon, posited early on that sexual harassment is
about power differences between men and women. Sexual harassment is a tool
used to perpetuate hierarchy, the principal way in which men maintain their
169
dominance in American society. As several psychology researchers described
the theory,
[a]ccording to this model, male dominance is maintained by cultural patterns of
male-female interaction as well as by economic and political superordinancy.
Society rewards males for aggressive and domineering sexual behaviors and
females for passivity and acquiescence. . . . [T]he function of sexual harassment
is to manage ongoing male-female interactions according to accepted sex status
norms, and to maintain male dominance occupationally and therefore
economically, by intimidating, discouraging, or precipitating removal of women
170
from work.

This theory fits well with what is known about men who sexually harass. These
men are influenced by dominance—power—in their relationships with women.
Thus, this provides an explanation of why women who are provocatively

168. See Dennis Hall, Delight in Disorder: A Reading of Diaphany and Liquefaction in Contemporary
Women’s Clothing, 34 POPULAR CULTURE 65, 66 (2001). Hall sees four fashion tactics that are being
used by women to reveal more skin: (1) presenting underwear as clothing; (2) choosing clothing that
is cut to be highly revealing, i.e., plunging necklines, slit skirts, bare tummies, short shorts; (3)
diaphany (see-through garments); and (4) what he terms liquefaction (the use of opaque fabrics that
fit so tightly that they cling like skin). A rather ironic instance of this recently arose within the
United States Office of the Special Counsel (OSC), which is the office that protects federal workers
and whistle-blowers. The OSC recently put out an office newsletter of “Business Casual” do’s and
don’ts that included not wearing short skirts and tight pants, advising women that, “before choosing
a skirt to wear,” they should “sit down in it facing a mirror.” Elizabeth Williamson, A Published Dress
Code is Dressed Down in Furor, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A25.
169. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 107 (1979).
170. Sandra S. Tangri et al., Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES
33, 40 (Winter 1982) (citation omitted).
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dressed might not be bringing sexual harassment cases: They are not good
potential targets for harassers. If, as studies of rapists suggest, harassers look for
more passive or submissive women, women who are provocatively dressed may
appear more confident and are therefore less likely to be considered appropriate
targets by potential harassers. Indeed, the cases involving requests that women
dress more professionally or tone down their sexy attire suggest that people are
generally uncomfortable with women who dress provocatively in the
workplace. The power dynamic involved in telling women to dress less
provocatively (essentially trying to control their attire) is also interesting. It
suggests that there is power in dressing provocatively, and that employers are
171
uncomfortable by such assertions of this power by women.
I am aware that I am extrapolating at least in part from research on rapists
for this argument. This is one area that requires further study by social scientists
to determine whether sexual harassers are picking their targets much like rapists
pick their victims—based on indications of passivity and submissiveness. At this
point, this theory is somewhat speculative—rapists and sexual harassers share
some common characteristics, and victims of rape and sexual harassment also
share several common characteristics. To the extent that there is incomplete
research on sexual harassers, this essay serves as a call to social scientists who
study sexual harassment to do further scholarship on how sexual harassers
choose their targets.
There is another problem with this potential explanation. Just because a
woman is dressed provocatively does not mean that she is necessarily confident
and therefore less likely to be submissive. It could well be that her lack of
confidence is what induces her to dress provocatively, in an attempt to draw
what she considers to be positive attention to herself. Perhaps there is a class of
cases that never make it to court because the women involved do not find the
attention their attire garners harassing. Indeed, they may enjoy the attention.
Further, to the extent that the attention is considered complimentary (i.e., it is
not derogatory or otherwise demeaning), it may not be objectionable by these
women.
Other sexual harassment theorists posit that sexual harassment is a result of
172
an interaction between people and workplace characteristics and situations.
Workplace environments in which sexualized images, comments, and behavior
toward women are tolerated are more likely to be those in which women are
173
sexually harassed.
This theory, however, is not inconsistent with the
power/dominance model. In workplaces with such atmospheres, women are
placed in less powerful positions: They are essentially deemed sex objects. It is
little wonder that sexual harassment thrives in such environments, given the
little organizational power afforded to women.
This also might explain the one set of cases where provocatively dressed
women are commonly harassed: the Hooters cases. Studies show that men high

171.
172.
173.

Further examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
BEINER, supra note 42, at 126.
See id. at 126–30.
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in LSH are aware of situational constraints on their behavior. Thus, in an
environment like Hooters, where the Hooters Girl’s “predominant function is to
provide vicarious sexual recreation, to titillate, entice, and arouse male
175
customers’ fantasies,” men who are likely to sexually harass will consider the
Hooters’ business plan to permit (perhaps even encourage) such harassment.
Thus, while provocative dress might signal confidence in an office setting, at
Hooters, workplace norms encourage men who are so inclined to harass.
What about the women who complain about men making comments about
their attire as part of their sexual harassment allegations? It is not clear whether
these women were dressed in a provocative manner or not. Certainly, in some
cases they were not. For example, in Conley v. City of Lincoln City, the plaintiff
176
was in her police uniform. In addition, employers in these cases (aside for rare
177
exceptions such as the lingerie case ) did not argue that something about the
plaintiff’s attire “caused” the plaintiff to be harassed. Yet, clearly inappropriate
comments—including those that are sexually demeaning—about workplace
dress offend women. They are a weapon in the arsenal of harassing behaviors
that affect women’s employment. Some of these comments clearly would
undermine a woman’s workplace authority, because the comments are
demeaning and thereby undermine the plaintiff’s power and authority in the
workplace. Even in the case involving the police chief, commenting, although
apparently in a complimentary fashion, about her attire could cast her as
something to look at rather than someone who leads the police force. One could
imagine how these comments might have affected her ability to lead and why
she included them in her complaint. Thus, comments about dress are used to
undermine the workplace authority of women and should be included in the
appropriate case as part of a plaintiff’s sexual harassment allegations.
V. CONCLUSION
When I began research for this article, I expected to find many cases
involving allegations that the plaintiff “welcomed” the sexual harassment by her
workplace attire. I was surprised to find that this was a rare case. Defendants
were not using the woman’s dress to weasel out of claims, but instead, the
woman’s dress most commonly was present in allegations by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs frequently raised comments about their dress as part of their sexual
harassment allegations. This would seem to open the door to defendants, who
might use evidence of target dress to argue that the plaintiff welcomed the
harassment. Yet, that was not the case. I have tried to account for the lack of case
law and, in the process, have gone back to the root cause of sexual harassment:
power. Sexual harassment is about power; therefore, a target who is dressed
provocatively is not the ideal target for the would-be harasser, who appears
motivated at least in part by his ability to dominate his victim. Provocative dress

174. See id. at 130 (discussing studies).
175. HI Ltd. P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
176. No. 02-216-AS, 2004 WL 948427, at *4 n.2 (D. Ore. Apr. 20, 2004).
177. Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C., No. IP 98-646-C H/G, 2000 WL 684101 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2000).
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does not necessarily signify submissiveness but instead may be an indication of
confidence and assertiveness. It is clear, however, that comments about dress
directed at plaintiffs are a component of sexual harassment allegations.
Comments about dress are used to undermine working women’s authority and
should be considered seriously by courts assessing sexual harassment claims.

